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A B S T R A C T   
The profile of small-scale fisheries has been raised through a dedicated target within the United Nations Sus-
tainable Development Goals (SDG14b) that calls for the provision of ‘access of small-scale artisanal fishers to 
marine resources and markets’. By focusing on access to fisheries resources in the context of European Union, in 
this article we demonstrate that the potential for small-scale fishing sectors to benefit from fishing opportunities 
remains low due to different mechanisms at play including legislative gaps in the Common Fisheries Policy, and 
long-existing local structures somewhat favouring the status quo of distributive injustice. Consequently, those 
without access to capital and authority are faced by marginalizing allocation systems, impacting the overall 
resilience of fishing communities. Achieving SDG14b requires an overhaul in the promulgation of policies 
emanating from the present nested governance systems.   
1. Introduction 
The targets set by the United Nations’ Sustainable Development 
Goals, agreed in 2015, have provided an unprecedented push for the 
research and policy trajectories in different sectors, based on a 
comprehensive understanding of sustainability, including the oceans 
(SDG14) [1,2]. One of the ocean subtargets is SDG14b which calls for 
the provision of ‘access of small-scale artisanal fishers to marine re-
sources and markets’. Such a target specifically dedicated to small-scale 
fisheries derives from the fact that these are present in almost all 
countries and account to more than half of total production on average, 
thus requiring sufficient and distinctive protection in the sustainability 
trajectories (UN 2019). The main indicator as defined by the UN to 
monitor the implementation of SDG14b is the progress achieved by 
countries in applying a ‘legal/regulatory/policy/institutional framework 
which recognizes and protects access rights for small-scale fisheries’ 
(SDG14b.1). 
Achieving SDG14b requires tools and policy provisions which are 
sufficiently adapted to fit the governance complexities that characterise 
small-scale fishing systems. It is certainly also contingent on the political 
will to accomplish the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development as a whole, including the highly relevant SDG 14.6 on the 
prohibition of fisheries subsidies, which fundamentally underpins sus-
tainable and equitable fisheries [3]. Our focus here is the European 
Union, and how SDG14b is taking shape, given that the EU Member 
States (MS) have endorsed the SDGs, and thus require fisheries policy 
trajectories to achieve this target [4]. The institutional and regulatory 
framework that determines access to resources in the context of the EU is 
defined by the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) [5] - a regional policy 
which is revised every 10 years to cater for governance needs in the 
fisheries realm [6]. Chronologically, the latest CFP reform (in 2013) 
happened two years before the adoption of SDGs (2015), a factor which 
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might justify why there is no direct link to SDG14, or any of the SDGs, in 
the CFP (recital or article) text. 
However, the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) does include specific 
objectives which are in some ways conducive to SDG14b. For example, 
Article 2 speaks on the need for ‘a fair standard of living for those who 
depend on fishing activities, bearing in mind ‘coastal fisheries and socio- 
economic aspects’ (Article 2.5. f). To attain this goal, Article 17 of the 
same regulation speaks of allocation of fishing opportunities at MS level. 
Specifically, it states that when allocating fishing opportunities MS shall 
use ‘transparent and objective criteria including those of an environ-
mental, social and economic nature (…) with a consideration to the 
impact on the environment (…) the contribution to the local economy 
and historic catch levels.’ Furthermore, the same article establishes that 
‘Member States shall endeavour to provide incentives to fishing vessels 
deploying selective fishing gear or using fishing techniques with reduced 
environmental impact’. Although Article 17 does not specifically 
mention the terms ‘small-scale’ or ‘artisanal fisheries’, the article is the 
tool which determines the criteria of access to quota-regulated fishing 
opportunities across EU countries, and which thus has a leverage on the 
access possibilties for small-scale fisheries. 
With SDG14b putting a clear direction to provide access to small- 
scale fisheries, it appears relevant to investigate how or whether the 
EU’s framework is sufficient to reach such a globally-relevant target. 
Recently, in a European Parliament-commissioned study about the 
allocation of fishing opportunities, most EU MS affirmed that the ‘social, 
economic and environmental criteria are considered in setting fishing 
opportunities, fulfilling the objectives of the CFP’; yet noting that while 
economic and environmental objectives were easily catered for, ‘social 
concerns are considered difficult to consider in the allocation process’ 
[7]. If the social component has been challenging in the allocation of 
fishing opportunities, is Article 17 – the cornerstone of the EU’s efforts to 
bring about progress to the small-scale fleets – a sufficient element of the 
EU CFP to allow or ensure accomplishment of SDG14b? 
The small-scale fishing sector in the EU comprises around 75% of the 
vessels in the EU commercial fleet [8], and considered to consist of 
small-to-medium-sized enterprises, mostly operating vessels smaller 
than 12 m not using towed gears [9]. However the sector is quite 
heterogenous across different EU MS, with many characteristics - 
including the features of the fleets considered as small-scale - being 
defined at the national level [10]. Despite such European diversity, 
numerous studies have demonstrated that the small-scale and coastal 
fishing communities have faced access issues in the allocation of fishing 
opportunities to harvest marine resources [11–14]. The overall profit-
ability of the sector has recently been reported to be much lower than 
the large-scale counterpart [8], and to a large extent this decline appears 
to have been caused by limited access to fishing opportunities [15]. 
Fishing opportunities in the EU are determined by multi-scalar 
governance systems. At the EU level, the Council of fisheries ministers 
decides on the fishing opportunities, referred to as Total Allowable 
Catches (TAC) for each MS following the principle of relative stability 
and scientific advice from ICES or STECF [16]. Once the TAC is allocated 
to the MS, the responsibility for managing it is with the MS, and no 
supervisory role is foreseen for any of the EU institutions.1 Each MS has 
the discretion to allocate the TAC assigned to it across its fleet segments, 
small or large scale. Recent research has found that small-scale fisheries 
are not adequately involved in the allocation process with their needs 
largely still disregarded [17]. It also states that the allocation of fishing 
opportunities in the MS still lacks transparency and accountability, and 
that ‘very few changes have been made in order to allocate quotas ac-
cording to social and environmental criteria, as required by Article 17 
[17]. In this regard it is opportune to investigate the approach of MS to 
fulfil the objective of SDG14b in the context of the legal framework, 
specifically Article 17 of the CFP. 
In this article, we seek to qualitatively understand what is happening 
‘on the ground’. To do so, we draw on four case studies to showcase the 
issues around “access” for small-scale fisheries by navigating the para-
digms of management systems, access to decision-making systems 
(including governments and the role of fishers’ organizations) and ac-
cess to capital and to markets. Drawing on Ribot and Peluso’s theory of 
access [18], we argue that access is determined by ‘the constellations of 
factors including means, relations and processes that (dis)enable actors 
to derive benefits from resources’. Thus, understanding access requires 
an in-depth analysis of how these mechanisms operate to determine 
one’s ‘ability to derive benefits from things’ [18]. In other words, the 
extent to which the allocation process provides access to small-scale 
fisheries is determined by the governance procedures, and the mecha-
nisms that shape the distribution of benefits, which in turn affect 
resource management and use, efficiency, equity, and sustainability 
with consequences for well-being, justice, conflict, and co-operation.’ 
[18]. 
The scope of this study is not to give a complete picture of the small- 
scale access issues to fishing opportunities in Europe, but rather to 
provide detailed insights into common access challenges demonstrated 
in different countries. In other words, the article provides new knowl-
edge on the complexity that surrounds small-scale fisheries access to 
resources in the context of local governance systems. Acknowledging the 
fact that the findings are based on a limited number of examples and 
exclude many other situations of EU small-scale fisheries, the case 
studies have been selected by the authors to represent typical or recur-
rent issues as they happen in different countries. The selection provides 
insights from different socio-political profiles encompassing different 
regional seas and fisheries (Mediterranean, Atlantic, Baltic Outermost 
Regins), which equally showcase that despite the distinctive contexts, 
realities for small-scale fisheries are similar across the board. In the 
following section, we define the conceptual and methodological 
framework to investigate the access issues. Successively we present 
empirical descriptions of such matters through the case studies, and 
ultimately we compare and contrast access challenges across the EU 
context, and provide recommendations for the governance of access 
paradigms. 
2. Conceptual and methodological framework: theorizing the 
multiple facets of access 
This paper is based on a review of existing theories and thinking from 
published literature, contextualised and substantiated with fieldwork 
data collected in fishing ports in Denmark, the Canary Islands (Spain), 
Portugal and Malta. Our methodology combines fieldwork within fish-
ing communities and analysis of policy documents which detail the 
management systems in the respective MS, to decipher the access issues 
facing small-scale fisheries. Interviews and participatory observation 
were conducted with fishers, and such data was complemented with 
other sources including online forums, media articles, and formal na-
tional statements such as management plans, public statements and 
other statistical information. Through these data sources we detail the 
challenges and barriers that might be influencing the outcome of access 
for small-scale fisheries. Empirical analysis here allows us to understand 
access to resources by SSFs, including the socio-political factors behind 
them, and how they unfold at the local level. By engaging in in-depth 
fieldwork and utilizing various published resources, we engage in a 
process to identify and map the dynamic processes and relationships of 
access to fishing opportunities (quota). We widen our ‘access lens’ to 
cater for access to decision-making systems at governmental and fishers’ 
organization level and access to capital, as well as authority relations, 
which collectively ‘form strands that constitute and configure webs of 
access’, and which define the mechanisms by which access is gained, 
1 That the implementation is mostly a matter for MS was also highlighted by 
the Comission, which noted that ‘the way Article 17 is drafted does not give tools to 
[the] Commision to do anything drastic’, leaving most of the interpretation to 
Member States.” 
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maintained and controlled [18]. By relating the outcomes of access 
policies to the rubric of the CFP and its implementation, we have been 
able to showcase the policy gaps and how these have determined the 
trajectories of access and the fate of small-scale fisheries in different 
fishing communities across the European coasts. 
2.1. Denmark 
2.1.1. Management: the vessel quota share system (VQS) 
The Danish small-scale fishing sector targets a variety of species with 
multiple gears across the year; but in general, the SSF fleet targets the 
same demersal species as the Danish large-scale (demersal) fleet. In 
2007, Denmark introduced an ITQ-like market-based fisheries man-
agement system, known as the Vessel Quota Share (VQS) system for 
Danish demersal fisheries, replacing a previous system of periodical 
catch shares. The initial allocation of quota shares was done on the basis 
of historical catches and only vessel owners were allocated quota (tied to 
their vessels). Kicking off the process a few years earlier, an ITQ system 
had been introduced for the more capital-intensive pelagic fisheries. The 
introduction of the ITQ and VQS systems followed years of failed at-
tempts to bring the Danish fishing fleet capacity in line with biological 
fishing opportunities and end overcapacity. The national organisation 
for demersal fishers first argued against an ITQ solution in the demersal 
fleet, but during the political negotiations the opinion of the board 
shifted, leaving a large part of the small-scale fishers within the orga-
nisation feeling unrepresented. 
With the aim of protecting the small-scale fishing fleet in the new 
market-based management system, the central government2 introduced 
a “coastal fishing scheme” along with the VQS system, to cater for 
coastal fishing vessels, defined for this purpose as quota share vessels 
under 17 m with minimum 80% of their fishing trips lasting less than 48 
h. Under this scheme, vessel owners sign up for a time-limited period in 
exchange for additional non-transferable quota calculated on the basis 
of their own individual amount of VQS (the more one owns, the more 
one receives). While enrolled, vessel owners can only sell their own 
quota shares to other enrolled vessels. A fixed amount of quota is tied to 
the scheme: the more vessels enrolling, the smaller the incentive. In 
2014, triggered by a forming alliance between small-scale fishers and 
environmental organizations, specific provisions for ‘low impact’ fishing 
gear were added to the coastal fishing scheme. The same year, small- 
scale fishers formed a new national organization for coastal, low- 
impact fishers. 
Despite the coastal fishing scheme, the VQS system have impactedon 
the stability of the small-scale segment. According to official statistics, as 
depicted in Fig. 1, between 2003 and 2016, the small-scale segment 
(incl. all commercially active vessels) saw a 24% reduction of its share of 
the value of fish landed - divided between a 33% reduction for the 
smallest (under 12 m) and a 20% reduction for the ‘larger’ small-scale 
vessels (here, due to data availability, defined as vessels below 18 m, 
rather than 17), while the large-scale counterpart (18 m and over) 
registered a 21% increase of its share, accounting for 64.6% of the total 
value of landings in 2016, up from 53.3% in 2003. Also within each 
length category, the share of catch has shifted towards the largest ves-
sels. The changes in the fleet structure has also affected the balance 
between gears, where trawl is increasingly becoming the dominating 
gear. Vessels fishing primarily with gillnets, a ‘classical’ Danish SSF 
vessel, accounted for 14.4% of all Danish landings in 2003, in 2016 this 
share was reduced to 7.7% Fig. 2. 
2.1.2. Access challenges facing small-scale fisheries 
Despite the articulated political intention of ‘protecting’ small-scale 
fishing, the change of management system led to accelerated concen-
tration of quotas on increasingly larger vessels. The coastal fishing 
scheme has not been adequate to sustain small-scale fishing. Since it is 
possible to withdraw vessels from this scheme and then sell VQS in the 
‘open’ market, the scheme failed to stop the drain of quotas from the 
small-scale, coastal fishing segment [19–22]. Similarly, the relative 
shares of quotas ‘connected’ to various ports have also shifted from 
smaller to larger ports with severe consequences for some local com-
munities [23]. The decrease of the small-scale or coastal fleet was, as 
evident from the data, an issue already present before the introduction 
of the VQS system but before 2007 it followed more or less the general 
trend of the fleet. In other words, the implementation of the VQS system 
facilitated and accelerated a number of dynamics that in the past ten 
years has put Danish coastal fishing under unprecedented pressure. The 
system was – explicitly - introduced as a means to reduce overcapacity. It 
was therefore from the outset the expectation that the new system would 
result in a significant reduction of the collective capacity of the fleet. The 
question was, however, how the capacity reduction would be distributed 
across fleet segments; a main parameter turned out to be access to 
‘external’ capital. 
Looking back, it was a problem that a market-based system had been 
introduced earlier in the capital-intensive pelagic sector without proper 
Fig. 1. Share of consumption landings intended for human consumption 
(value) by length category in 2003 and 2016.The data excludes industrial 
landings (intended for reduction to e.g. fish meal and oil) and the specialized, 
blue mussel fishery, but includes pelagic landings for human consumption 
(mackerel and herring) (based on data from Table 3.11 of the Yearbook of 
Fishery Statistics of the Danish Fisheries Agency, 2003 and 2016; available at 
https://fiskeristyrelsen.dk/english/fishery-statistics/publications/). 
Fig. 2. Maltese bluefin tuna catch statistics between 1990 and 2015 as 
compiled from the ICCAT database: https://www.iccat.int/en/t1results.asp?ls 
pecies¼BFT&lyearf¼1990&lyeart¼2014&lflag¼EU.Malta&lgear¼blank&cgea 
r¼all&lorder¼SpeciesCode&lregion¼MEDI&btsearch¼Search. The artisanal 
fishery catches have been predominant between 1990 and 2007 and succes-
sively with the reforms of the BFT policies, the catches have declined to 
commensurate the national total allowable catches, and were mostly caught by 
the purse seine fleet which was introduced in 2005. 
Source: Said et al., 2016 
2 Region divisions in Denmark deal mainly with the health sector. 
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ring-fencing between that and the demersal sector. The pelagic fisher-
men thereby got a head start in learning to navigate the new manage-
ment system and the acquisition of quota – in effect they thereby had 
superior access to both capital as well as knowledge resources on how to 
manoeuvre in the system. Today, many of the large quota holders in the 
demersal sector are fishers who started in the pelagic fisheries. As 
opposed to under the previous system, the VQS system enables vessel 
owners to use quota shares as collateral for loans. Anyone - small or large 
- can do so, but evidence shows that larger vessel owners have access to 
loans (capital) at lower interest rates than the smaller. This affects both 
the small-scale fishers but also the next generation, who either have to 
find the financial support to buy into an expensive quota market or have 
to rent quota shares from fishers, who have been favoured by the 
market-based systems, and are now also earning money from renting out 
their quota shares [23]. 
In December 2016 - prompted by the new national organization for 
small-scale fishers - a majority in the Danish parliament agreed to 
introduce further measures to support, among other things, the 
declining coastal fishing sector, as a way of giving ‘life’ back to the 
decaying fishing ports and the local economies therein. The agreement, 
wherein small-scale fishers skilfully injected their ideas on policy pref-
erences – through support from environmental NGOs - contained a new 
coastal fishing scheme operating alongside the original one [24].How-
ever, contrary to the original, the new scheme does not have an opt-out 
possibility: enrolled vessels remain permanently in the scheme along 
with their VQS – thereby restricting the power of ‘large-scale priviledged 
access’ to capital. The incentive for joining - and never be able to sell 
VQS to (larger) vessels outside the scheme - is a substantial extra quota 
allocation based on and relative to existing VQS. Only vessels under 15 
m or vessels under 17 m that only use the defined low-impact gear types 
may join. 
The fixed amount of quota set aside for the new scheme is about four 
times the amount distributed in the original scheme in past years [25]. 
One can argue that this might be the only real strategy to improve access 
to small-scale fisheries to address the situation of their sustainability, 
however, its effect to truly entice younger generations is hard to predict. 
In fact, in its first year, only 58 vessels joined the scheme, presumably 
due to the risk of tying themselves to lower selling prices of VQS [20,24, 
25]. In 2019, both coastal fishing schemes were evaluated, and it was 
decided to increase quota allocations for low-impact vessels in the new 
protected scheme making the incentives to join indefinately this scheme 
even stronger [26]. The benefits accrued by the SSF through the most 
recent policy adjustments remain to be seen in the near future. 
2.2. The Canary Islands (Spain) 
2.2.1. the TAC management system 
In the past 30 years in Spain, bluefin tuna fishing has become 
dominated by the large-scale purse seine fleet and tuna traps (alma-
drabas), which, due to their intensive fishing capacity have muscled out 
the hook-and-line fleets who were finding less tuna to catch. Intensive 
bluefin tuna fishing across Atlantic and Mediterranean by both purse 
seiners and industrial long-liners has in fact led to the collapse of this 
species, triggering the International Commission Conservation for 
Atlantic Tuna (ICCAT) to enact a multiannual recovery plan from 2007 
to 2022 through a number of measures including the establishment of 
global TAC that saw the allowable catch decrease by nearly 50% be-
tween 2009 and 2012 and the imposition of fishing capacity restrictions. 
Spain, represented in ICCAT through the EU, was assigned with a TAC 
which the national administration distributed to the fleet according to 
the ‘recent’ historical records, the years in which the bait boats from 
northern Spain, purse seine large-scale fleet and tuna traps had been the 
most active fleets. As a result, the main quota recipients have been the 
purse seine fleet and the almadrabas (large fish traps), collectively 
having nearly 60% of the national TAC. 
Other fleets like the pole and line fleet of the Canary Islands only had 
access to bycatch quota for many years (with the requisite that bluefin 
tuna had to be under 10% of total tuna catch onboard) in very limited 
amounts. The allocation of TAC has marginalized the local hook-and- 
line fleets of the Canary Islands, even though this hook-and-line fleet 
had been quite active as a fishery before the purse seine fleets took over 
in the mid-1980s. Statistics show that between 1965 and 1980, the 
Canary Islands caught 16% of the total catches of bluefin tuna in Spain 
[27]. Given that the historical records used for the quota distribution 
was based on the more recent history, the Canarian fisher organizations 
were not able to claim their right to the quota, also because the Canarian 
government could not influence the allocation process which was 
managed by the central government in Spain. At the time of writing 
there are two main company groups that control most of the bluefin tuna 
for fattening purposes within tuna ranching farms, a very lucrative in-
dustry focused on foreign markets such as Japan and the USA. This 
makes the management of the bluefin tuna quota a highly politicized 
arena where the access to the small-scale fleet remains a contentious 
issue despite the existence of historical rights and the presence of legal 
criteria that should be taken into account for the quota distribution in 
line with Article 17 of the CFP. 
2.2.2. Access issues facing small-scale Fishers 
Small-scale fisheries in the Canarian fleet has been able to secure 
only an average of 2.5% of the national TAC between 2008 and 2015 
which they could declare only as bycatch [27]. The small-scale segment 
has not been able to access more quota because the criteria that the 
Spanish government considered when calculating the fleet quota was 
based only on the last years of catch records before 2008, a time when 
small-scale fishers were not as active as the large-scale counterpart due 
to collapsing stocks. In this regard, small-scale fishers were not 
accounted for as ‘historical users’ with fishing rights, despite having an 
important role in bluefin tuna fishing before the stocks, and their 
catches, started dwindling due to intensified large-scale operations. So, 
in principle, the national administration, which used only recent his-
torical records to assign TACs across the fleet segments, did not have the 
responsibility to assign quotas to the Canary Islands. In line with the 
established law, the fleet could only benefit from a bycatch quota, 
known as contingency catches that could be used in cases where bluefin 
tuna is caught along with other types of tuna species. 
This situation of allocation, which has been pervasvive for around 10 
years, was seen as unfair by fishers, and through their organizations 
(Cofradias and Producer Organizations) engaged in a series of protests 
towards the national government. They participated in the national 
media and featured in the 2017 LIFE3 Documentary ‘Blue Hope Tuna’ 
where, together with other fishers from around the Mediterranean, they 
called for improved access of bluefin tuna to small-scale fishers. These 
undertakings, which were supported by the Regional Government and 
the Fishers Organizations (with the new Regional Federation of Cofra-
días), greatly increased the visibility and the voice of the Canarian fleets 
in their request to overhaul the status quo. Further support was sought 
from the academic realm, with the Canarian Government requesting the 
Universities to develop reports about historical catches and environ-
mental impacts of the Canarian fleet. By accessing this ‘hidden’ 
knowledge, the Canarian sector and the Regional Government, gained a 
new form of ‘knowledge/power’ that bestowed them with sufficient 
authority to take the national regulations to court. Such an appeal at the 
highest levels of authorities in Madrid were crucial for the Canarian fleet 
to bring home some quota for the people on the islands. 
With an increase in the national TAC in 2018 (following signs of 
recovery in the species at the ICCAT level), the Canary fleet benefitted 
from 255 tonnes in 2018 and more than 400 tonnes in 2019. The amount 
3 Low Impact Fishers of Europe, an international organization that integrates 
small scale fishers organizations from around Europe (Percy and O’Riordan 
2020 (in press)). 
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of TAC, however, still does not compare to the quotas that are assigned 
to other fleets, and to the position/catch rate that the Canarian fleet had 
in the bluefin tuna sector before the 1980s. In fact, in 2018 the whole 
fleet of the Canary Islands (more than 240 boats) was given less quota 
(255t) than what is assigned to one purse seiner (260t). Moreover, access 
issues were felt at the fleet level due to the manner in which the TAC 
assigned to the Canary fleet was handled. Although implemented as an 
open-access fishery with good intentions to give equal opportunity to all 
vessels to fish collectively until the quota is depleted, research shows 
that access was not ascertained for those with smaller vessels, or for 
vessels in islands where bluefin tuna schools swim into their waters later 
in the season - and are thus not able to compete on an equal level playing 
field. For obvious reasons, those with large or mid-sized vessels and who 
are seasonally-better positioned to catch tuna are favoured by such TAC 
system, leaving not much hope amongst other fleet participants to 
benefit from the fishery. 
Moreover, this sort of open-access strategy has demonstrated to be a 
market disaster, because the large amount of catches in a short period 
saturated the markets and prices plummeted. For 2019, discussions have 
been in place to assign specific quotas to different vessels to avoid the 
race to fish and the market saturation that the open TAC system was 
leading to. However, this has instigated a number of conflicts over the 
allocation criteria at the vessel level. Since no agreement was reached 
between the fisher organization and the regional government, the na-
tional government intervened and assigned individual quotas to each 
boat, taking into account only its length, thereby preferring the larger 
vessels but including many smaller boats that had not fished habitually 
bluefin tuna, and creating further access issues and fragmentation 
within the fleet. Due to these inconsistencies the quota for 2019 for the 
Canarian fleet was not exhausted in the expected period, opening a new 
window for the fishery from 4th November to 13th December, open to 
all registered boats for bluefin tuna until quota exhausted. Evidently, the 
complexity of the fishery as a socio-political system, and the heteroge-
neity of the sector makes access matters both sensitive and difficult to 
manage. 
2.3. Portugal 
2.3.1. TAC management system 
In 2009, following an ICES recommendation, the EU established a 
TAC for all skates (rajiformes) and forbade the landing of three species, 
one of which was undulate ray [28]. The undulate ray is classified as an 
endangered species in the IUCN red list of threatened species and this 
prohibition was implemented as a precautionary measure due to the lack 
of data on the state of skate’s stocks in the EU. Portugal was among the 
MS without statistical records at the species level - as before 2009 
landings were registered for skates as a group [29]. Despite the lack of 
data on undulate ray, it is well known, mostly through fishers’ and local 
scientists knowledge, that this species has been captured mainly by 
polyvalent small-scale local vessels (under 9 m, responsible for 95% of 
landings; the rest being landed by trawlers) and is an important species 
due to its relatively high commercial value at first auction [30]. 
Following contestations by Portuguese fishers associations who 
claimed that undulate ray is an abundant resource in Portuguese waters, 
in 2014 the Portuguese Institute for Fisheries Research (IPMA) started a 
research project, in collaboration with two fishing associations from 
harbours near Lisboa (Setúbal and Sesimbra4) in order to start collecting 
data on undulate ray. Based on the results from this project the Portu-
guese government has managed to negotiate a specific precautionary 12- 
tonne quota with the EU. With the quota, a set of management measures 
were established by the Portuguese government [31], such as the 
implementation of a biological closure, monthly compulsory reporting 
of catches, and a minimum (78 cm) and maximum (97 cm) landing size. 
Besides, these management measures special permits, named “experi-
mental fishing licenses”, were assigned to fishers on an annual basis, 
starting in 2015 and continuing until today [32]. The permits are allo-
cated following negotiations with the sector’s representatives. Vessels 
with the special license permits can catch up to 30 kg of undulate ray per 
trip, whilst those without a license can land one undulate ray per trip 
[31,32]. 
In 2015, 50 licenses were assigned, and the recipients of licences 
were vessels whose owners were collaborating with the ongoing 
research project. At the time, licenses were only given to the local fleet, 
fishing with trammel nets and with a historical track record of skate 
landings prior to 2016 [31], excluding trawlers from the experimental 
licence allocation. Since 2017 the quota increased to 15 tonnes, and the 
number of licenses to 60. In 2019, the allocation criteria changed, 
increasing the national coverage and allowing also vessels without large 
historical landings of skates (but with a historical track records of 
landings of soles and flounders) to also apply for the experimental li-
cense. The 60 permits attributed were distributed only to the small-scale 
fleet in the three main regions of the Portuguese coast (north, center and 
south), with more licenses attributed to harbours with a higher track 
record of skates’ landings. Those who have licenses are obliged to 
collaborate in scientific studies conducted by IPMA [32]. 
2.3.2. Access issues facing small-scale Fishers 
The main issue is related with the existence of the precautionary 
quota itself rather than the allocation of the quota, although the latter 
factor cannot be disregarded. Fishers criticize the precautionary quota 
mainly because it was established without scientific data or studies, and 
without including the local knowledge of fishers about the state of the 
stocks in the decision. The top-down management process brings to light 
the tensions in access to knowledge and power, mainly concerning the 
inability of fishers’ knowledge to intercept and influence both the heg-
emonic scientific knowledge and the supranational policy-making 
realms where this specific quota have been established. With the com-
ing about of an unrealistic quota that does not equate the small-scale’s 
previous catch rates, the issuance of special permits caused some divide 
between those who got quota and those who did not, creating feelings of 
injustice. Many fishers claim that the quota is too low and should be 
higher and open to all, and then closed when the quota is caught. In 
general, there is a feeling that some measures are too protectionist and 
that the social and economic consequences of these measures are not 
taken into consideration. Even though the Portuguese administration 
recognized the importance of this fishery for the small-scale fishing 
sector and made an effort to get a quota, even if a small one, many fishers 
still feel that Portugal does not have a strong capacity to negotiate 
quotas at the EU level. 
Further access challenges result from the fact that the small-scale 
sector is not well organized and as a result remains poorly represented 
in the decision-making process [32,33], which influence the distribution 
of special licenses for undulate ray. The lack of “Associativism”, i.e. 
culture of identification, trust, and active participation in associations, 
has hampered any form of collective action [34–36]. Despite being able 
to press the Portuguese government to get a quota, fishers associations 
still do not have a strong position in the management of their activity so 
fisher’s have been unable to bring about effective change on their own 
through individual resistance. The lack of access to decision-making fora 
is further reinforced by the way that management authorities have dealt 
with the matter. Authorities see fisher’s associations mostly as entities to 
be consulted or as mediators in defining the allocation of quotas, rather 
than active decision-takers. This results in a situation where fishers’ 
views on allocation are not well recognized, and they perceive the pol-
icies as illegitimate. In some cases, they are not hesitant to resist such 
laws and land undulate ray given that this forms an important compo-
nent of their livelihood. 
Although the quota allocation for undulate ray is experimental and 
4 Setúbal Pesca fishing association; APACS, shipowner’s association. The 
ethnographic data presented was collected with Setúbal Pesca and its members. 
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not representative of the usual allocation of quotas in Portugal, it follows 
similar criteria for distribution, based mainly on historical landings. The 
system has not changed since the CFP reform in 2013. However, as 
pointed by Carpenter and Kleinjans [17], regarding the implementation 
of Article 17, the Portuguese government stated in its submission to the 
commission, that licensing accounts for the economic dependence of 
communities involved in traditional fishing and the history of compli-
ance. Indeed, in the particular case of undulate ray the allocation of 
licenses, and consequently quotas, benefits small-scale fisheries, instead 
of other segments of the fleet (trawling), thus one can argue that it is in 
compliance with Article 17. Nonetheless, the extent to which the policy 
provides access to small-scale fishers at large through social justice 
criteria, and thus to the sustainable continuation of the sector, remains 
questionable. 
2.4. Malta 
2.4.1. The TAC management system 
The management of tuna in Malta, like in the case of the Canary 
Islands emanates from the ICCAT and EU regulations, through which 
Member States implement national management plans to assign quotas 
to the fishing fleet. The dawn of the management plan in the island 
recognized fishers whose catches were officially registered through the 
government’s department, which included around 100 fishers 
comprising 10% of the fleet, with some fishers arguing that the figure 
was incorrect as it did not account for fishers using other markets to sell 
their catches. The fishing opportunities, as negotiated with the repre-
sentatives of fishers’ cooperatives, have been distributed according to 
historical records since the inception of the bluefin tuna recovery plan in 
2009. The purse seine (PS) fleet, which made inroads into the sector in 
2005 and had no historical records to benefit from a national TAC was 
able to become an active segment by leasing quotas from fishers owning 
ITQS, a market-based governance system that was introduced in 2009 
through the Bluefin tuna recover plan. With the implementation of ITQs, 
the purse seine fishery became the largest operator which controls the 
market in terms of ITQ leasing, as well as the export market, making the 
small-scale fisher totally dependent on it [14]. Between 2009 and 2015, 
there has been a concentration in the ownership and benefits gained 
from the quota, which predominantly favoured the PS, which is the fleet 
with the highest level of access to economic and political power in the 
tuna sector. The PS, which is also involved in the ownership of tuna 
ranching systems, has been purchasing ITQs of the smaller and least 
wealthy ITQ holders. These companies now possess the quota and the 
fishing permits of many artisanal vessels, and since 2014 have enjoyed 
the annual TAC increments that have been assigned on each artisanal 
permit by the government. 
2.4.2. Access issues facing small-scale Fishers 
The allocation system of the BFT categorized the fleet into large-ITQ- 
holders, medium-ITQ holders, small-ITQ-holders and non-quota holders. 
In 2010 over 50% of quota was held by 16% of fishermen and until 2015, 
the ownership of ITQs has become even more concentrated. This is 
because between 2014 and 2016, the accumulation of fishing rights and 
windfall gains of TAC increments has favoured few enterprises that own 
multiple permits based on historical records, whereas fishermen with no 
permits or with small/medium quotas have been unable to acquire 
quota since the prices of fishing permits and quota have escalated to 
unaffordable ranges. Fishers wishing to partake in the fishery could do 
so by purchasing permits already in the market, however this was very 
unfeasible due to the price tag attached to these fisheries, and thus 
determined by one’s access to capital. With the increase in TAC since 
2017, some new fishers were able to participate in the fishery through a 
specific TAC assigned by the government to no-permit holders. Further 
changes happened in 2018, with a little TAC devoted for newcomers, 
and a higher increase in 2019 with an ostensible widening of the net. 
Recent Ministerial decisions informed that after 10 years of the bluefin 
tuna recovery plan, the Government will issue new bluefin tuna permits 
for fishers who have records in the swordfish sector [37]. This decision 
has given the possibility of around 50 new fishers to benefit from bluefin 
tuna, however it has raised some commotion amongst fishers using 
trammel nets for demersal fisheries, who argued that the implementa-
tion of bluefin tuna quotas in parallel to swordfish catches directly ex-
cludes them from getting a permit to fish tuna. Some have argued that 
such decision was triggered by those closest to power within f the fishing 
co-operatives, who are likely to gain from such a scheme. This system, 
although widened the prospects for more fishers in the sector, has closed 
the doors for potential entrants who do not have swordfish quotas, and 
the younger generations who would like to start-up in fishing ventures. 
As things stand, the purse seining fleet and the concomitant tuna 
ranching industry will remain the major players in the fleet as they own 
the largest component of the quota, and have relatively better access to 
capital and power. So although the tuna is coming back, the fishing 
communities are not the main beneficiaries, also because historical 
policies have shaped and institutionalized quota control patterns. Also, 
throughout this time, the sector, which was before engaging in collective 
action to protect the sustainability of the fleet has transformed, with 
fishers fragmented by tuna rights fishing systems that has turned them 
into individualistic opportunity-seeking enterprises that derails their 
ability to come together and fight back for the communities. This is 
likely to perpetuate the access challenges for small-scale fishers and 
their inability to change the status quo, unless sufficient attention is 
deployed on small-scale fisheries at multi-governance scales, and a 
realistic redistribution of quotas is implemented. 
3. Discussion 
This article uses four EU jurisdictions to investigate access matters in 
fisheries quota allocations, and the role of Article 17 in determining 
access for small-scale fisheries, as expected in SDG14b. Although having 
distinctive socio-political contexts and targeting different fisheries, all 
case studies indicate a level of inequality in access to natural resources 
and the management of them. Such inequities are resulting from the 
highly-politicized nature by which Article 17 of the CFP is being inter-
preted and implemented at the national level. This, we argue, indicates 
that access cannot be simply understood or determined by a simple 
formula prescribed in legal provisions. Instead, access should be 
perceived as a ‘power game’ where access to knowledge, authority, and 
capital [18], determines one’s ability to benefit from the fishing access 
opportunities. The level to which small-scale fisheries are benefitting 
from the resources, thus, requires a closer and nuanced look of the 
on-the-ground, material realities of how access to fishing opportunities 
is orchestrated by these vary interconnected strands of access within the 
national systems. 
The case studies show that the systems governing access – which 
include (i) national administrations negotiating with fishers’ organiza-
tions, or (ii) producers’ organizations who have legal jurisdiction on the 
allocation process - rarely include all fisher members groups equally. In 
fact, these seem to benefit larger-scale fleets, who tend to be better 
organized and more vocal than the small-scale counterparts in decision- 
making fora [38]. Here we demonstrate how the ‘access to authority’ is 
being predominantly controlled by individuals who also have ‘access to 
knowledge/power’ and the skills to determine how policies are crafted 
to fulfil particular agendas [39]. By maintaining their presence around 
the decision-making tables, those with knowledge/power are able to 
A. Said et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Marine Policy 118 (2020) 104009
7
influence and define how rights and ownership of fishing opportunities 
are formed and legalized through national legislative texts [40]. Even 
though we saw indications of small-scale fishers organizing and 
becoming more professional at ‘playing the access game’ in the political 
arena (e.g Denmark and Canary Islands), their ability to benefit from 
increased quotas was limited. This happens mostly due to the resistance 
triggered by existing ‘powerful’ players towards new inclusive policies 
based on ‘redistributive’ [41], and ‘regrabbing’ schemes [42]. The 
outlier in this aspect is Portugal’s undulate ray fishery as small-scale 
fishers have been preferred over large-scale trawlers in the allocation 
of quota, although this story is not representative of all Portuguese 
fisheries quota systems. 
Access to capital has also been fundamental to determine one’s po-
sition in the fishery, especially in the case of tradable quotas which 
permits high-capital fleets to concentrate quota ownership through 
market transactions. Having highlighted this, however, it is also note-
worthy that the transferability is somehow pushed by obligatory tech-
nical measures which require MS to reduce the national fishing capacity 
(number of vessels) to commensurate with fishing opportunities. This 
efficiency-driven fisheries governance model tend to reward fleet seg-
ments of a larger-scale nature as they are often better-positioned to 
invest and enlarge their fishing capacity and control of quota [12]. These 
policy-induced effects - having their origins in a CFP and national reg-
ulations oriented towards the ‘economic efficiency’ of the European 
fishing fleets – have somewhat created ‘institutional path dependencies’ 
[43] that do not easily permit new and inclusive forms of allocation 
systems at the MS level. As fisheries policy is dependent on the initial 
decisions and resources historically committed, starting policies from 
scratch is hardly possible, and only incremental change is feasible. So, in 
simple terms, any “new system” is only half-way new. 
Even if MS attempted to move beyond the grandfathering technique 
by widening the net of opportunities through new policies, there has not 
been significant changes in the benefits that small-scale fishers gained 
from the fisheries resources. This is because any well-intentioned 
strategy ‘on paper’ is equally determined by parallel factors/influences 
played by the ‘invisible’ roles of (i) the market which governs quota 
transactions within and across the sector, and which facilitates con-
centration [44]; (ii) the leadership in fishers’ organizations which might 
not be representative of the sector at large, thus leading to distributive 
injustices [45], and the (iii) ‘inertia’ of political bureaucracies as coined 
by Congleton [46] – which means that institutions may not be suffi-
ciently adaptive to respond to complex and dynamic factors that sur-
round access strategies [47]. In other words, these dynamic market and 
fishers’ representative systems and their effects on access remain outside 
the purview of the governments when innovative access schemes are 
implemented. Even if innovative schemes have been present in, for 
instance, Denmark, which is probably the ‘most’ advanced 
quota-distribution system in these case studies, its effectiveness has been 
far from remarkable to engender enhanced access for small-scale 
fisheries. 
The qualitative insight into the various governing paradigms deter-
mining small-scale fisheries access to fisheries resources, and their 
ability to benefit from such resources, shows that access is shaped by 
multiple layers of complexity emanating from the CFP and national 
regulations. This prompts questions on whether the problems of access 
resulting from the lack of political will or ability to enact inclusive 
policies, are also emanating from the lack of greater precision on allo-
cation by Article 17. While the article ‘obliges’ MS to include social 
criteria, it only requests the MS to ‘endeavour’ to provide fishing op-
portunities to low-impact fishing sectors – i.e. mostly those which are of 
a small-scale nature. This wording does not exactly bestow a legal re-
sponsibility on MS to engage with the needs of small-scale fisheries. 
While such an approach is in line with the principle of subsidiarity that 
empowers MS to make decisions regarding the economic and social di-
mensions of their fisheries policies at national level, Article 17 may be 
disappointing from the point of view of not delivering fundamental 
changes to the small-scale sector. Moreover, from the case studies, it is 
evident that due to the lack of clear guidance of social elements to 
consider when implementing access criteria, the MS are unlikely to 
move much beyond the status quo [48]. 
Here we suggest that a more promising tool for visible progress 
would be to have the CFP specify more explicitly the social goals of the 
protection of the small-scale fleet, and to determine the tools to achieve 
them, such as a disclosed set of social criteria indicators embedded in the 
principles of equity and justice [49]. Currently, the list of social in-
dicators informing the access criteria for fishing opportunities, comprise 
‘employment generated’, ‘contribution to local economy’ and ‘social 
corporate responsibility’ [7], neither of which are directly and explicitly 
linked to social justice principles. In other words, the essential elements 
of what ‘socialness’ should be about in fishing opportunities seem to be 
absent5 [48]. Indicators which can bring more effective and distributive 
change are needed if SDG14b ought to be fulfilled. Such indicators could 
be developed through already-established working groups,6 also facili-
tated by the state-of-the-art framework of allocation developed by Smith 
et al. [50]. Parallel efforts would also be necessary in the EU data 
collection framework (DCF) through a wider lens for social data that 
goes beyond the current datasets, which are merely demographic in 
nature. 
For example, more focus on data to study social wellbeing [51] could 
provide an in-depth understanding of on-the-ground quota access re-
alities of small-scale fisheries and coastal communities - similar to what 
has been gathered in this study. This data could then furnish MS with 
knowledge on how best to align fisheries allocation processes to the 
complexity of their fishing communities. We argue that such proposi-
tions could be considered in the next round of CFP revisions - the 
redrafting of Article 17- and the DCF, also in the consideration of 
effecting the pathway for SDG14b. On these lines, the forthcoming CFP 
negotiations could also draw more on the FAO Voluntary Guidelines for 
Sustainable and Secure Small-Scale Fisheries [52] which, through the 
principles on ‘tenure’ provide a more human-rights based approach to 
the allocation criteria for small-scale fisheries. Otherwise, as long as the 
improved share for the small-scale fisheries in the EU remains couched 
in terms of encouragement/tentative possibility and ambiguous social 
criteria - as is currently provided in Article 17 - small-scale fishers would 
continue to struggle under the existing structural issues. Moreover, 
given the historical tendency of lack of accountability and transparency 
in the decision-making processes of quota allocation systems [53], 
Article 17 and SDG14b may at best be used to reinforce the rhetoric on 
paper and government discourses, but not to bring about a significant 
change. 
In the end, effective change depends on the commitment at various 
governance levels, and the political will to enact the required overhaul. 
It is our contention then, that the success of Article 17, and the 
concomitant target set in SDG14b ultimately depends on the vision of 
MS and how they decide to utilize the legislative tools to enact the 
necessary changes. Evidently, this article shows that in truly effecting 
transformation through new access paradigms, a wider fisheries gover-
nance lens is required to delve beneath the legislative text and gain a 
closer look at what else requires to change and how. It demonstrates that 
it is fundamental to study and monitor how quotas are assigned and 
through which decision-making systems (government, fishers, markets), 
and in parallel decipher how historical trajectories of privatisation and 
long-existing participatory governance systems could be interfering with 
newly-enacted systems of (re)distribution [41,42]. Recognizing these 
5 The human-rights based approach is mentioned in the CFP recitals, however 
linked to the fisheries partnership agreements done between EU and third 
countries, not specifically to the fishing allocation legislative text.  
6 The working groups on social indicators of the (i) Scientific, Technical and 
Economic Committee for Fisheries, and of (ii) International Council for the 
Exploration of the Sea. 
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inherent political processes through empirically-driven conceptual in-
sights is necessary to achieve real differences in the way governance of 
access is implemented for small-scale fisheries both in EU and beyond 
[54]. 
4. Conclusion 
This article is based on four EU case studies to provide insights into 
the multiple facets of access currently operating within and through the 
national fisheries governance systems responsible for the allocation of 
quotas, and how these are implicating on small-scale fisheries sustain-
ability. It reveals that the malleable provisions of Article 17 of the EU 
CFP has not been sufficient to ensure access to small-scale fisheries, and 
thus cannot be relied upon to achieve SDG14b on the ground. We argue 
that the obligation for Member States to devote attention to social 
criteria in the allocation of fishing opportunities, and the endeavour 
towards allocating incentives to fishing vessels utilizing low-impact 
gear, indicate the right factors to address in the journey towards 
SDG14b. But while Article 17 may represent a right step for the 
accomplishment of the objective of empowering small-scale fisheries 
within the SDG 14b, its success is heavily interrelated with a number of 
access-determining factors, including access to authority, knowledge 
and power, that underlie and influence the allocation systems. Among 
them are the historically determined issues of representation, incre-
mentalism and uncertainty. Not less important are the political inertias 
that have mostly had a focus on medium or large scale fleets, and dis-
regarded the small-scale sector as increasingly irrelevant. 
These trends have been reinforced by the inadequacy of piecemeal 
government attempts to support small scale fishers, and for which, we 
argue, a systemic overhaul is needed to reduce recurrent access in-
equities. Given that the rate of ‘success of access’ through Article 17 is 
contingent on a number of other factors, we demonstrate the need for 
empirically-driven nuanced analysis that deciphers the politicized na-
ture of the fishing allocation process. Specifically, focus is necessary to 
understand the various negotiations which rarely involve small-scale 
fisheries effectively, and flexibility-ridden supranational policy tools 
that further disempower them. With limited representativeness of the 
case studies, the narrative provides a broad representation of access is-
sues emanating from different management systems and for different 
fisheries regulated by the CFP. In this way, it provides novel knowledge 
on the theory of access in the context of fishing opportunities, and 
contributes to the perennial questions of social justice in quota distri-
bution both within EU MS and beyond. Empirically, the analysis also 
highlights the need to attend to on the ground details to understand 
inequities that can result, even where national decision-making may be 
well-intentioned. This is necessary to inform what potential governance 
transformations are needed, and through which channels should such 
changes be effected, to enhance access for small-scale fisheries in line 
with SDG14b. 
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